The banking industry and the Comptroller of the Currency won three Supreme Court rulings allowing banks to sell annuities and other insurance products. Overall, bank stock prices have not changed significantly surrounding these rulings. However, these rulings significantly decreased insurance company stock prices. Life and health insurance companies and insurance agencies have the most negative reactions. Property-liability insurance companies have a less negative response. Insurance companies that sell via a brokerage system have the highest stock returns. The results are consistent with contestable market theory. Decreasing entry barriers reduces the economic rents of insurance companies and changes the competitive structure among insurance companies.
INTRODUCTION
Regulatory statutes traditionally segregated financial service companies. Before recent regulatory rulings, banks were unable to cross-sell banking, insurance, or security products. Based on current regulations, banks can take advantage of opportunities to sell insurance or to underwrite securities. Kane (1984) and Dickens (1996) depict the fusion of financial services as an application of the theory of contestable markets. The theory of contestable markets (CMT), set forth in Baumol (1982) and Baumol, Pansar, and Willig (1982) , explains why industry structures other than perfect competition may be optimal. The basis of the theory is that no industry earns economic profits for an extended period unless barriers prevent other potential sellers from entering the industry. In a contestable market, incumbent firms price their products and services at a level that discourages new competition. Regulatory restrictions to market entry prevent the free entry of competition.
Whether the removal of entry barriers reduces future cash flows in the insurance industry is an empirical question. When barriers to entry are removed, incumbent Kenneth A. Carow is assistant professor of finance at the Kelley School of Business of Indiana University, Indianapolis. He is grateful for the valuable suggestions of Randall Heron, Philip Powell, Glen Larsen, participants at the Financial Management Association and Kelley School of Business research seminar, and three anonymous referees. Financial support by First Indiana Bank and Indiana University is also gratefully acknowledged. firms may experience increased competition. 1 After removing barriers to entry, the long-run economic rent to incumbent firms is reduced; however, the contestable market theory does not require positive economic rents for new entrants. The increased threat of competition may force the incumbent insurance firms to reduce their earning spreads. The increased competition and spread reduction imply that the long-run economic rents to banks entering the insurance industry may be insignificant. Fama and MacBeth (1973) state that any change in the expected economic profit of the industry is immediately captured in firm stock prices. If the removal of barriers restricting banks from entering the insurance markets results in a reduction of future cash flows for incumbent insurance companies, the stock value will reflect this reduction on the date of the announcement.
This study focuses on how a reduction in the insurance industry's barriers to entry affects the value of company stocks within the insurance and banking industry. The author analyzes two important questions concerning the contestable market theory. First, did barriers to bank entry provide the insurance industry or a segment of the insurance industry with increased competition? Second, did the ability of banks to enter into the insurance market increase the value of the banking industry?
The results show that barriers to bank entry did provide the insurance industry with protection from increased competition and that the level of protection varied by industry segment. Overall, insurance companies experienced a significant reduction in wealth surrounding the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) and Supreme Court rulings. Changes in wealth are dependent on firm characteristics. Insurance companies with insurance agencies and life and health insurance companies have the most negative wealth effects, but insurance companies that market their products through a brokerage system have significantly higher returns than firms that do not market through a brokerage system. Banks did not gain from their ability to enter the insurance market. This is shown by an insignificant change in stock prices for banks surrounding the dates of the OCC and Supreme Court rulings. These results are consistent with contestable market theory.
The study is organized as follows: the first section provides a historical overview, reviews the literature, and develops the hypotheses; the next section describes the sample and methodology; the section after that presents the results from the event study; and the final section summarizes the results and concludes.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND HYPOTHESES

Historical Overview
While the recent passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) allows financial holding companies to cross-sell each other's traditional product lines, it does 1 The level of new competition is dependent on the cost structure of the new entrants. If the entrant's costs are higher than the incumbent's costs, the entry barriers are not binding and industry changes are not expected.
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not provide the ideal conditions to test whether financial markets were contestable. 2 The first entry of banks into the insurance market provides a better point of reference. For several years before the passage of the GLBA, banks were allowed to sell insurance products. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) granted national banks the right to sell fixed-rate annuities in 1985 and variable-rate annuities in 1990. The 1995 and 1996 Supreme Court cases upholding the OCC rulings have brought this segment of regulatory change to completion.
Compared to the GLBA, the OCC rulings provide a clear set of events to analyze the removal of barriers to entry in the insurance industry. Unlike the GLBA, the OCC rulings do not allow for mergers between banks and insurance underwriters. Thus, the changes in stock prices are not related to merger opportunities but related to the ability of banks to effectively enter the insurance industry. Furthermore, unlike the GLBA, the one-sided nature of the OCC rulings allow analysts to determine the impacts of bank entry into insurance (removal of barriers to entry in the insurance industry) without the confounding effects of allowing insurance companies to enter the banking industry.
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The one-way removal of entry barriers to bank sales provides ideal conditions to empirically test for support of contestable market theory predictions.
The OCC recently ruled that two provisions of the National Bank Act authorize national banks to sell insurance products. The incidental powers clause (Section 24) authorizes banks to exercise "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking." The small town exception (Section 92) allows national banks to engage in a general insurance business if the bank is located in a town where the population is 5,000 or less.
The rulings involving Section 24 center on the debate concerning which products are the domain of the insurance industry. On April 4, 1985, the OCC granted national banks the right to sell variable annuities. Then, on February 12, 1990, the OCC granted national banks the right to sell fixed-rate annuities. In both rulings, the Comptroller concluded that annuities are not insurance for purposes of the National Banking Act. These rulings were challenged in the Supreme Court case NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company. The case originated in 1990, when NationsBank sought permission from the OCC to sell fixed and variable annuities. The Comptroller granted NationsBank the authority to act as an agent in the 2 Under the GLBA, a financial holding company may both underwrite and sell insurance and annuities. However, the GLBA continues to limit national banks and their subsidiaries to the sale of insurance and annuities. The primary change is the elimination of the town of 5,000 constraint.
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Banks are allowed to purchase an insurance agency but must divest any underwriting activities. The sample does not include any pure insurance agencies (without underwriting activities). During the 1980s, few if any pure agencies had publicly traded stock. 4 Without these controls, one would need to show which firm was more likely to benefit from barrier reductions. For example, would the bank industry gain more by being granted access to the insurance industry or would the insurance industry gain more from being granted access to the bank industry? Similar questions would need to be considered for the negative implications of increased competition. See Carow (2001) for return evidence surrounding the Citicorp-Travelers Group merger and Carow and Heron (2001) for return evidence surrounding the passage of the GLBA. sale of annuities. In August 1993, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court ruled that annuities are an insurance product. The Supreme Court overturned this ruling on January 18, 1995, stating that annuities are not exclusively the product of insurance companies, but rather a general financial product, saleable by banks.
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The rulings involving Section 92 focus on whether banks have the authority to sell insurance products under the National Banking Act of 1916. On August 18, 1986, the OCC held that, under Section 92, a national bank or its branch that is located in a town with a population of 5,000 or less may sell insurance to existing and potential customers located anywhere. In other words, although the bank or bank branch must be located in a small town, it can sell insurance to persons or businesses located outside that town.
The Supreme Court addressed several issues. One issue was whether Congress had repealed Section 92 of the National Banking Act in 1918. Another issue related to the existence of any geographic limitations on where sales could be made. The question of whether Section 92 had been repealed arose because of the use of quotation marks in the 1918 amendments. Further confusion was caused by the fact that Section 92 appeared in the United States Code through 1946; however, after 1946 it was left out, with a notation that the provision was omitted in a 1918 amendment. On June 7, 1993, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress did not repeal Section 92 in 1918 and supported the right of banks to sell insurance without geographic limitation from offices located in towns of 5,000 or less. However, the Supreme Court did not address whether state or federal laws had final authority in this area. Many state insurance laws prohibit the sale or brokering of insurance products by national or state-chartered banks. The National Banking Act gives federal law preeminence over state laws related to banking; however, the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 gives state law preeminence over federal laws related to insurance. Thus, the courts needed to determine if the authority of banks to act as insurance agents is governed by insurance statutes or by banking statutes. Gallagher, the Florida State Insurance Commission, argued that states have the right to restrict bank insurance activities. In Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Gallagher, the Florida State Insurance Commissioner, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals stated that Florida statute is a law regulating the business of insurance and is protected from federal preemption by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 . On March 26, 1996 , the Supreme Court overturned the ruling of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress intended the National Banking Act to override contrary state law. This gave national banks the right to serve as insurance agents and sell insurance nationwide, as long as their insurance operations were based in a bank subsidiary or a branch located in a town with a population of 5,000 or less.
Literature Review and Hypotheses
Proponents of granting banks the ability to sell insurance argue that increased competition in the insurance industry will provide consumers with more economically priced products and greater access to insurance products. This argument is consis-5 See Kirsch (1997) for more detail.
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tent with Stigler's (1971) theory that one group or coalition (insurance companies) can use the regulatory process to improve its competitive position within an industry.
Contestable market theory shows that the removal of entry barriers can reduce the long-run profits of existing firms in the industry. Baumol, Pansar, and Willig (1982) argue that the amount of this reduction is dependent on the level of sunk costs, the cost structure of new entrants relative to incumbents, and the freedom of entry and exit.
Sunk costs are expenses that are necessary to enter the industry, but not recoverable upon exit from the industry. Because of the potential for economies of scale between banks and insurance companies, sunk costs for banks are expected to be small. For banks, the cost of offering a new insurance product is reduced by their prior investment in branches, employees, and processing equipment. Additional costs are likely to include the establishment of a relation between the bank and an underwriter and the training and/or hiring of employees to cross-sell insurance products. Furthermore, because banks are selling an insurance product that is likely to be underwritten by an existing insurance firm, the product is similar to existing insurance products. Contestable market theory holds that the level of new competition depends on how bank selling costs compare to the selling costs of the insurance industry. Felgren (1985) and Todd and Murray (1988) argue that banks may have a cost advantage in selling insurance relative to existing insurance companies. The final assumption of contestable market theory is free entry into and exit from the industry. Baumol (1982) states that, for the entrant, "free" entry and exit are not suffering any disadvantages in terms of production or perceived quality as compared to the incumbent. Free entry is not necessarily costless or easy. The greater a bank's cost efficiency at delivery and the lower the costs of entry or exit, the greater the competitive threat posed by banks. Increased competition for insurance sales may force insurance companies to lower prices or reduce the quantity of insurance products sold. If regulations restricting the entry of banks into the insurance market protected insurance companies from full competition, the stock prices of insurance companies would fall when rulings allowing bank entry into the market were announced.
The first hypothesis answers the basic question: Did barriers to bank entry provide protection from increased competition for the insurance industry as a whole? The author hypothesizes that increased competition from allowing bank entry will result in negative returns for insurance companies. Based on this hypothesis, the following null hypothesis was tested.
Null Hypothesis 1: On the event dates surrounding the rulings allowing banks to sell insurance, the average excess stock return of all insurance companies is insignificantly different from zero.
The second part of the first question is: Do barriers to bank entry provide protection from increased competition for a segment of the insurance industry? The gains or losses within the insurance industry may depend on firm-specific characteristics. Robert Bates, president and CEO of Guarantee Mutual Life of Omaha, argues that the bank distribution channel may increase the demand for insurance, providing growth opportunities for banks and insurance underwriters. The new rulings allow qualified banks to sell insurance and annuities; however, the rulings do not allow banks to underwrite insurance products. Insurance companies that place greater emphasis on the sale of insurance may lose value, while insurance companies that are primarily involved in the underwriting process may gain value (White, 1996) .
The method of distribution may also have an effect on the level of new competition for insurance companies. Insurance companies distribute their products through direct writers, exclusive agents, independent agents, and brokers. Direct writers have employees who use direct mail, telephone solicitation, or mass-media advertising to solicit policy sales for a single insurer. An exclusive agent represents a single insurer. An independent agent represents more than one insurance company. A broker represents the customer and negotiates with multiple issuers. 6 Banks are expected to use insurance companies that sell through brokers to underwrite their insurance sales, rather than renting space to existing agents.
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This will lead to increased competition for insurance companies that use agency systems or direct writers. Insurance companies that sell their products through a brokerage system may be in a better position to contract with banks to sell their insurance products.
In addition to the segmentation of the insurance industry by distribution system, the insurance industry is also segmented by product offerings. The two primary segments are (1) life and health insurance and (2) property-liability insurance. A General Accounting Office (GAO) study (GAO, 1990) argues that a brokerage system has a higher cost in delivering property-liability insurance; therefore banks are expected to concentrate more heavily on life insurance activities. The evidence in Europe also shows that banks are more likely to concentrate their efforts on life insurance sales. In 1994, the percentage of life insurance distributed through European banks was 55 percent in France, 21 percent in Spain, and 8 percent in Germany. In comparison, property-liability sales by European banks have gained a much smaller foothold in Europe, with percentages of 19 percent in Spain, 5 percent in Germany, and 3 percent in France (McDaniel, 1996, p. 22f ). The author hypothesizes that the level of competition from bank entry is dependent on the insurance company's characteristics. Insurance companies that have greater involvement in the sale of insurance (Agencies, SIC=6411) are expected to have lower stock returns. Insurance companies that sell through a brokerage system will have higher stock returns than insurance companies that sell via direct writing or through agents. Finally, banks will emphasize the sale of life insurance products, significantly increasing the competition in the life insurance segment. The increased competition will result in lower stock returns for life insurance companies than property-liability insurance companies. Through cross-sectional analysis of abnormal returns, the author tests the following null hypothesis concerning insurance company characteristics:
Null Hypothesis 2: On the event dates surrounding the rulings allowing banks to sell insurance, the average excess stock returns of insurance companies are not significantly affected by the company's distribution system or product segment.
The second question asks whether banks can obtain additional economic rents through lower barriers to entry. Felgren (1985) argues that the extensive branch system will allow banks to deliver insurance products at lower costs than traditional insurers. If significant economies of scope between selling insurance and traditional banking activities exist, banks may gain from increased revenues. Todd and Murray (1988) argue that a bank's established customer base and customer knowledge will provide bank-insurance firms with a competitive advantage when barriers to cross-product sales are removed. James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) show that banks obtain valuable private information through customer relationships. Berger and Udell (1995) and Chakravarty and Scott (1999) show that banks use private information in pricing their products.
Granting permission for banks to sell insurance products is an option that banks can choose to exercise. Banks should choose to sell only products that increase the bank's value. Thus, banks are not expected to lose any benefits from these rulings. However, this does not imply that banks must gain from the option to sell insurance. The basis of the contestable market theory is that no industry can earn economic profits for an extended period unless barriers to entry block new entrants. Based on these studies, the author tests the following null hypothesis:
Null Hypothesis 3: On the event dates surrounding the rulings allowing banks to sell insurance, the average excess stock returns of all banks are insignificantly different from zero.
The amount of value added may differ by bank-specific characteristics. The OCC has direct regulatory authority over nationally chartered banks. Each of the rulings was made by the OCC. Given that nationally chartered banks are the most directly affected, they may have a different price response than state chartered banks. The difference between the price reaction of state chartered and nationally chartered banks is expected to be small, because 39 states allow state banks the same powers as nationally chartered banks. Furthermore, Rosen (1997) shows that state chartering agen-8 Boyd, Graham, and Hewit (1993) ; Boyd and Graham (1988); and Brewer, Fortier, and Pavel (1988) have considered the effect of insurance activities on the risk of the banking industry. These studies simulate mergers between bank holding companies (BHCs) and firms in nonbanking financial industries. Simulated mergers for insurance agencies (Szego, 1986) show insignificant changes in risk. Alternatively, Peltzman (1976) argues that regulation should lower market risk. Thus, deregulating the industry may cause an increase in industry risk, leading to a reduction in stock prices. Tests for changes in systematic risk are not reported because of space limitations. The results provide evidence of insignificant changes in a firm's systematic risk.
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PR Newswire (1995). Currently 15 states allow state chartered banks to act as brokers/agents for insurance companies, while 5 states allow state chartered banks to underwrite insurance. State chartered banks in Delaware, Idaho, North Carolina, and South Dakota and grandfathered institutions in Utah are allowed to underwrite insurance. State chartered banks in Alabama, California, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are allowed to be brokers for independent insurance companies. The author tested whether an indicator variable for state chartered banks where insurance sales are allowed influenced the study's final conclusions. In the cross-sectional analysis, this indicator variable did not have a significant effect on the excess returns surrounding the events. cies frequently compete with the OCC for the right to charter banks. This competition is expected to lead the remaining chartering agencies to approve regulations permitting state banks the same rights as national banks to sell insurance.
Some banks may be in a better position to benefit from these rulings. Based on the final Supreme Court ruling, banks with a location in a town of 5,000 or fewer will be able to expand their geographic scope beyond towns of 5,000 or their state's boundary. It is expected that a broader geographic scope will provide greater opportunities for banks with previously established insurance subsidiaries. 
DATA, EVENTS, AND METHODOLOGY
Data Collection
The data analyzed in this study consist of daily stock returns for a sample of 89 banks and 44 insurance companies. The bank sample is identified as banks or bank holding companies with a primary SIC code of 6020-6029, 6711-6712 and the insurance company sample, as firms with a primary SIC code of 6300-6339 on CRSP. Each company must have daily returns on CRSP from 1984 through 1996. The sample is further reduced to firms whose stock (1) was traded on at least 70 percent of the trading days, (2) had no missing returns during the estimation period or the event period, and (3) had no conflicting announcements during the period beginning one day before the event period through one day after the event period. The first constraint reduces problems with nonsynchronous trading. The second and third constraints reduce the problems related to unusual events that might cause a suspension of stock trading or have a significant effect on the stock price during the event period. Information concerning an insurance company's product offerings and distribution techniques was collected from Compustat and Best's Worldwide Insurance Directory. The Directory of Corporate Affiliations provides information about a bank's charter and the existence of an insurance subsidiary. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. National banks are 52.8 percent of the total bank sample. In 1996, 38.2 percent of banks had an insurance subsidiary. This compares to less than 30 percent in 1985. In the sample, 63.6 percent of insurance companies are life and health insurance firms, and 65.9 percent are property-liability insurance companies; therefore, 29.5 percent (63.6 + 65.9 -100) of the sample sells both life and health and property-liability insurance. In 1996, the mean market value of bank equity was nearly twice as large as the mean market value of 10 The author also considered alternative hypotheses related to financial characteristics. Tehranian (1989, 1990) show that larger banks may respond differently than smaller banks. Additionally, Best's ratings were also considered as a measure of risk. The coefficients were insignificant. Many insurance companies used more than one distribution system: 40.9 percent used a brokerage system, 86.4 percent used an agency system, and 25.0 percent used a direct writer system.
Significant Events in Reducing Barriers Between Banking and Insurance
The analysis focuses on six events where significant new information reached the capital markets. Since the OCC rulings are the first release of any information concerning new banking powers, the author analyzes these three events. As the OCC rulings were challenged in the courts, many different levels of court rulings could be analyzed. As in Billingsley and Lamy (1992) , the author incorporates only the Supreme Court rulings for the judiciary events.
To determine the market response to the OCC rulings and the Supreme Court decisions, the author obtained information concerning important events from LEXIS-NEXIS. For each event, the event period is the ruling date and the next trading date. Table 2 summarizes the six event dates. 
Methodology
The study measures the effect of the OCC and Supreme Court rulings on the security prices of banks and insurance companies by using event study methodology for each of the six events described in Table 2 . Given the nature of the legislative process, a multivariate regression model (MVRM) is employed, as used by Conett and Tehranian (1989); Sundaram, Rangan, and Davidson (1992); and Alexander and Spivey (1994) . This approach predicates the return generating process on the occurrence and nonoccurrence of the events and corrects the residual terms to reflect the covariances across the sample. The MVRM consists of a set of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) in which each event has two indicator variables. where R it = the observed return on firm i's stock on day t, R mt = the observed return on the value-weighted (including dividends) market index on day t, I t = the change in the interest rate on day t for the ten-year constant maturity treasury, D t = a dichotomous indicator variable equal to one for every day after the event period and zero otherwise, d 0 = a dichotomous indicator variable equal to one on the event day and zero otherwise, d 1 = a dichotomous indicator variable equal to one on the day after the event day and zero otherwise, n = the number of firms in each of the two systems of equations, and e it = the residual error term.
The parameters are jointly estimated using generalized least squares, which assumes that disturbances are independently and identically distributed within each equation but allows the variances to differ across equations. The coefficients, 0 i g and 1 i g , are a measure of the excess returns on the day of the ruling and the day after, respectively. Testing the summation of the excess returns across all n firms represents the formal test for the significance of the market's reaction to the rulings. Through the use of SUR, the joint hypothesis, (
nn gggggg +++++= … , incorporates heteroskedasticity and contemporaneously correlated disturbances.
As in Flannery and James (1984) , Yourougov (1990) , and Scott and Petterson (1986) , the author includes the market returns and the change in interest rates. The variable b i is the firm's measure of market risk, and c i is the firm's measure of interest-rate risk. For the post-event period, i b′ and i c′ measure the change in the firm's measure of market risk and interest-rate risk, respectively. Because of the insignificant results for the joint hypotheses testing for changes in market risk and interest-rate risk, only the excess returns are reported in Table 3 . Table 3 presents the results from the SUR model estimation. Panel A presents the excess returns surrounding the three events that concern a bank's right to sell annuities. Panel B presents the excess returns surrounding the three events that concern a bank's right to sell insurance products. Bank returns are presented in the first group of columns and insurance company returns, in the second group of columns. For each event and the summation across events, the author presents mean excess returns, F-tests of significance, and sign tests. The tests determine whether the mean excess returns are significantly different from zero for insurance companies (Null Hypothesis 1) or banks (Null Hypothesis 3). estimates, N is the total number of parameter estimates, and p is the probability of a positive estimate (.50). *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
ANALYSIS OF EXCESS RETURNS
Univariate Analysis of Events
For the rulings affecting a bank's right to sell annuities, banks have an insignificant mean cumulative excess return of -0.33 percent. The mean cumulative excess return for insurance companies is a significant -2.39 percent, which rejects Null Hypothesis 1. Presumably, as banks increase their share of the annuity market, banks will earn no better return than if they had invested in alternative investment opportunities in banking. Insurance companies may lose value because of more competitive pricing and/ or reduced market share. The most significant negative reactions are for the OCC rulings (April 4, 1985, and February 12, 1990) . Similar inferences regarding the negative effects of these rulings on insurance companies are drawn from the sign test. Over these three events, the proportion of positive cumulative excess returns (32 percent) in the insurance industry statistically differs from the expected proportion of 50 percent under the null hypothesis of no effect.
For the rulings affecting a bank's right to sell insurance products, banks also have an insignificant mean cumulative excess return of -0.25 percent. The mean cumulative excess return for insurance companies is -1.25 percent. Although smaller in magnitude, these results are consistent with the results for the annuity rulings in Part A. Investors anticipate that insurance companies have lost value because of increasing competition; however, banks do not gain. Consistent with greater contestability in the insurance markets, the long-run economic rents to incumbent firms has been reduced. However, as contestable market theory shows, new entrants are not expected to receive long-run economic rents.
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Cross-Sectional Regression Results Table 4 presents the results from the cross-sectional analyses of the firm's returns. Model 1 presents the cross-sectional results for the rulings affecting a bank's right to sell annuities. The dependent variable (CAR) for the first model is the summation of the firm's two-day excess returns for the three annuity rulings.
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Model 2 presents the cross-sectional results for the rulings affecting a bank's right to sell insurance products. The dependent variable (CAR) for the second model is the summation of the firm's two-day excess returns for the three insurance sales rulings. Model 3 provides an overview of how these two sets of rulings affect bank and insurance company returns. The dependent variable (CAR) for the third model is the summation of the dependent variables in Models 1 and 2. Long-run economic rents are possible for a new entrant only if (1) it has a price advantage over the incumbent and (2) additional barriers exist preventing the free entry of other potential new entrants.
Similar to the argument in Carow and Heron (1998) , summing across all significant events is necessary to determine the overall wealth effect of the rulings for at least two reasons. First, the probability that the rulings will ultimately become law is not 100 percent until confirmed in the courts. At any point before this, it may either clear legal hurdles-increasing the probability of being upheld-or fail to pass an important hurdle, which effectively reduces the probability of passage to zero. Second, as a bill moves through the judicial process, changes may occur in expectations as to whether the whole ruling or only certain sections of the ruling will be upheld. Cumulating excess returns across all pertinent events is therefore necessary to capture the overall wealth effects of the rulings because at the time of the Supreme Court ruling, the probability of being upheld has, by definition, reached 100 percent, and all portions of the rulings are fully known by investors. Furthermore, an average excess return may equal zero, but have a significant level of variability across firms. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (p-values for two-sided tests are in parentheses).
The independent variables are the same for each model. The cross-sectional regression model is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
6411
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The independent variables are a series of indicator variables. The variable NB is equal to one if the bank has a SIC code of 6321 (national charter); it is zero otherwise. The variable IB is equal to one if the bank has an insurance subsidiary and is zero otherwise. The intercept represents state banks without an insurance subsidiary. Variables NB and IB test Null Hypothesis 4. The variable S6411 is equal to one if the insurance company has a SIC code of 6411 (insurance agency), and is zero otherwise. The variable BR is equal to one if the insurance company uses brokerage as one of its distribution techniques, and is zero otherwise. The variable LH is equal to one if the insurance company has a SIC code of 631 or 632 (life and health insurance), and is zero otherwise. Finally, PL is equal to one if the insurance company has a SIC code of 633 (property-liability insurance), and is zero otherwise.
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LH, PL, S6411, and BR test Null Hypothesis 2.
Rulings Affecting a Bank's Right To Sell Annuities
Model 1 presents the results for the rulings affecting a bank's right to sell annuities. Based on the regression F-statistic, the first model is significant at the 1 percent level with an adjusted R 2 of 9.12 percent. The intercept is -0.11 percent. The intercept shows that state banks without an insurance subsidiary have returns insignificantly different from zero. Similarly, the returns of national banks and banks with an insurance subsidiary are not significantly different from the returns of state banks without an insurance subsidiary. These results fail to reject Null Hypothesis 4. The findings show that bank returns are not significantly different from zero and do not vary based on the charter of the bank or the existence of an insurance subsidiary.
The results from Model 1 reject Null Hypothesis 2. The insurance company's distribution system and product segment have a significant effect on the level of returns surrounding the event periods. Brokerage insurance companies have the highest returns, with a positive coefficient of 4.14 percent, significant at the 1 percent level. Banks are expected to act as brokers, selling annuities underwritten by insurance companies. For the insurance companies that sell through brokers (BR), banks provide a new distribution system that will increase the quantity of annuity underwriting. If banks enhance the distribution system of brokerage insurance companies, the increased sales may also reduce the sales of competing insurance companies that sell through direct writers or agents. Insurance companies that own an agency, S6411, have returns that are 4.67 percent less than the insurance companies without an agency, significant at the 1 percent level. Because insurance agencies do not underwrite insurance, banks are expected to be direct competitors with these subsidiaries.
Returns also vary by product segment. The coefficients for life and health insurance companies and property-liability insurance companies are both negative. The significant negative coefficient for life and health insurance companies (LH) provides 13 The author tested the model for problems with multicollinearity. Each variance inflation factor has a value less than two, revealing insignificant multicollinearity problems.
evidence that banks are expected to compete more heavily in the life and health insurance product market. This is consistent with life and health insurance companies having a larger annuity market share than property-liability companies. As banks sell more annuities, this reduces the ability of life and health insurance companies to sell annuities and the potential for cross product sales of life insurance products.
Rulings Affecting a Bank's Right to Sell Insurance Products
Model 2 presents the results for the rulings affecting a bank's right to sell insurance products from locations in towns of fewer than 5,000 people. The intercept shows that state banks without an insurance subsidiary have returns insignificantly different from zero. Two explanatory variables differentiate between banks, NB and IB. The coefficient for national banks (NB) is significantly negative at the 5 percent level, and the coefficient for banks with insurance subsidiaries is significantly positive at the 10 percent level. Based on the significant coefficients for NB and IB, Null Hypothesis 4 is rejected. As hypothesized, banks with an established insurance subsidiary are in a better position to expand their insurance sales than banks without an established insurance subsidiary. Surprisingly, national banks have returns significantly lower than state banks. The OCC rulings apply directly to national banks. State banks are regulated by state banking laws. The lower returns for national banks may imply that state banks have an advantage over national banks in entering this market, since many states have laws allowing state banks to act as agents for the sale of insurance products. In general, state banks are smaller than national banks. Therefore, an alternative interpretation may be that smaller banks responded more positively than larger banks. Additional models are considered to test this alternative in the section following the next.
For insurance companies, the return variation explained is lower in Model 2 than it is in Model 1. Consistent with Model 1, the coefficients for insurance companies with agencies and life and health insurance companies are negative, while the coefficient for brokerage is positive. However, only the coefficient for life and health insurance companies (LH) is significant at the 10 percent level. The results imply that rulings allowing banks to sell insurance products are expected to have a greater competitive effect on the life/health insurance industry than the property-liability insurance industry.
Combined Model of Annuity and Insurance Product Sales
The dependent variable in Model 3 is the summation of the six events studied in Models 1 and 2. By combining the events, Model 3 provides an overview of how these rulings affected the stock returns of bank and insurance companies. Model 3 is significant at the 1 percent level with an adjusted R 2 of 13.15 percent. As shown previously, returns for national banks are slightly lower than returns for state banks. Banks with an insurance subsidiary have returns insignificantly larger than banks without an insurance subsidiary.
The results strongly reject Null Hypotheses 2. Significant industry variation does exist for the insurance industry. As shown earlier, brokerage insurance companies have significantly higher returns than non-brokerage insurance companies. Section 92 of the National Banking Act does not allow banks to underwrite insurance. Therefore, banks must use an insurance company to underwrite their insurance sales. Brokerage insurance companies are in the best position to provide these underwriting needs. Insurance companies with a subsidiary agency and life insurance companies have negative coefficients, significant at the 1 percent level. Because insurance agencies do not underwrite insurance, banks are expected to be their direct competitors. The lower returns for life and health insurance companies are consistent with European banks having greater success in distributing life insurance than property-liability insurance.
Alternate Model Specifications
Given that national banks have lower returns than state banks, the goal of this section is to determine whether this is because of a size effect or because of the chartering status of the bank. In general, national banks are larger than state banks. For the sample, the average national bank had an equity value of $4.3 billion in 1996, compared to $1.7 billion for the average state bank. Furthermore, the rulings allow the underwriting of insurance in towns of fewer than 5,000 people, which are still dominated by small banks. Therefore, if rents are to be had for banks expanding into insurance, banks located in smaller towns may be more likely to be acquired by other banks, leading to higher premiums in the merger market. To determine whether size has any effect on the results, the author includes two additional variables in Table 5 : the log of the market value of equity for banks and the log of the market value of equity for insurance companies.
14 In general, the results in Table 5 confirm the findings in Table 4 . Compared to the models in Table 4 , the Adjusted R-squares and F-statistics for the first and third model in Table 5 show a small decrease in significance, but these measures show an improved performance for the second model. Only in the second model is the size variable for insurance companies significant. For Model 2 (insurance sales rulings), the coefficient for the size of the insurance firm is significantly greater than zero.
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For the second model, larger insurance firms had significantly higher returns than smaller insurance firms. Larger insurance companies may have less of a competitive threat from bank entry into the insurance industry. This may be because of the greater reputations of these firms or potential economies of scale (Kellner and Mathewson, 1983; Grace and Timme, 1992) . Based on the insignificance of the bank size coefficients, bank size does not explain the finding that national chartered banks have lower returns than state chartered banks. Similar results are obtained if the two variables for the log of size are replaced with two variables for the market value of equity or with two variables that are equal to one for firms with greater than $1 billion in equity value and zero otherwise.
The author also tested whether the results for the size coefficients were related to the inclusion of the two banks' indicator variables. Omitting the indicator variable for national banks and banks with insurance subsidiaries did not significantly change the results. Size is only significant for insurance companies in Model 2. 16 There are two other minor differences in Models 1 and 2. For Model 1, the annuity rulings, the coefficient for life and health insurance companies is insignificant; however this coefficient is significantly greater in Model 2. For both models, the negative coefficient implies that life and health insurance firms had lower returns than other insurance firms. The second difference is that the indicator variable for banks with insurance subsidiaries is no longer significant. Overall, the inclusion or exclusion of size does not have an effect on the conclusions for Model 3. h LMVB is the log of the market value of equity (in millions) for banks, and LMVI is the log of the market value of equity (in millions) for insurance companies. The value for Model 1 is at the start of the event period in 1990, and the value for Models 2 and 3 is at the start of the event period in 1993. The significance of the results is not dependent on the event date used to calculate the market values.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (p-values for two-sided tests are in parentheses).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The term bancassurance refers to the delivery of insurance products through banks. With the recent Supreme Court decisions, in 1993 Court decisions, in , 1995 Court decisions, in , and 1996 , upholding the rights of U.S. banks to sell annuities and insurance, the U.S. banking industry took the first steps toward the effective implementation of bancassurance. In a recent report on the legal climate for banks selling insurance, Thomas Workman and Laurie Briggs, attorneys at the law offices of Bricker and Eckler, wrote that each of the recent Supreme Court decisions "is significant in its own right ...
[V]iewed collectively, however, their impact on the right of national banks to sell insurance is staggering." Others, such as Carmen Effron, president of the Financial Institutions Insurance Association and president of Bank of Boston Insurance Company, project that "by 2002, banks here will become sellers of 20% to 30% of life insurance sold in the U.S." It's now less than 1 percent (Panko, 1997, p. 39) .
The author analyzes the returns surrounding the OCC and Supreme Court rulings that provide banks with the opportunity to sell annuities and other insurance products. Overall, insurance company stock returns are negative. The overall negative returns for the insurance industry show that the rulings by the OCC significantly reduced the value of the insurance industry. Consistent with contestable market theory, these results imply that barriers to bank entry protected the insurance industry from competition.
Barriers to bank entry provided greater protection to some segments of the insurance industry than others. The stock price returns differ by industry segment. Insurance companies with insurance agencies and life and health insurance companies have the most negative stock returns, but insurance companies that market their products through a brokerage system have a more positive price reaction. Because banks can sell but not underwrite insurance, insurance companies specializing in the sale of insurance and less in underwriting have lower returns. This is evidenced by the significantly lower returns for insurance companies with agencies. Banks are also expected to provide greater competition in the life insurance market. Greater competition reduced the value of the life insurance industry. Because the OCC rulings do not allow banks to underwrite insurance, banks must find an existing insurance firm to underwrite their insurance sales. Brokerage firms are in the best position to take advantage of this new opportunity to underwrite the insurance sold by banks. Among insurance companies, brokerage firms had significantly higher returns than nonbrokerage firms. Thus, banks may benefit brokerage firms that underwrite bank insurance sales; however, the sale of insurance by banks will increase competition for sales made by insurance agencies and life insurance companies.
If the insurers have lost value, do banks gain this value? No, the average stock price of banks did not change surrounding the rulings that have allowed banks to enter the insurance sales market. The findings imply that investors anticipate that the value of banks entering the insurance market will not exceed the value of existing bank investment opportunities (zero long-term economic profits). These results are consistent with economic theory. When barriers to entry are removed, new and potential entrants increase price competition resulting in lower values for incumbent firms but no change in value for potential entrants.
If insurance companies have lost value and banks do not gain, then who gains? One group that is not included in this study is the customer. 17 Potentially, the increased competition from banks selling insurance may reduce the cost of insurance for customers. Lower premiums would reduce the economic rents to the insurance industry while providing a competitive return for bank entrants offering insurance and annuities. Customers may also gain greater convenience. Bank investments in new locations for insurance agents/brokers may reduce customer search costs. Customers that switch from insurance companies to banks for their insurance and annuity needs reduce the insurance company's revenues, resulting in lower stock prices for the insurance company.
For banks considering entry into the insurance market, these results include a word of warning: Carefully analyze your investment opportunities in the insurance market. Investors anticipate that banks will earn the average rate of return, not large profit margins. For insurance companies, the free entry of banks is likely to increase existing and potential competition. The threat of entry, if not the actual entry of banks, will lead to more competitive pricing and/or lower sales volumes. However, insurance companies that underwrite the sales of the new bank distribution channel are expected to benefit.
